CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS OF CARTEL AGREEMENTS IN THE MARKET: FOREIGN EXPERIENCE

Abstract

Many jurisdictions unanimously view cartel as the most severe violation of competition law. To combat cartels, antimonopoly bodies use special mechanisms, such as leniency programs, and impose harsh administrative and criminal penalties. Identifying and verifying cartel collusion is not an easy task for antitrust authorities: this task is even more difficult in oligopolistic markets. Oligopolistic market conditions allow market participants to achieve price coordination without direct communication with each other; a practice that is often referred to as tacit collusion in the relevant literature and discussions are ongoing about the definition of tacit collusion. Due to the lack of explicit and direct communication, the question of whether tacit collusion should be recognized as a form of cartel behavior is controversial among jurisdictions and among academics. In addition, there is a kind of confusion in the competition law and regulatory communities about the distinction between deliberate parallelism and tacit collusion. Based on the experience of Japan, the EU and the US, this article aims to clarify the definition of tacit collusion. Moreover, recommendations for Uzbekistan on how to regulate and prevent tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets were provided in this article.