ADOPTION OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE AS A REGULATORY-LEGAL DOCUMENT: PROBLEMS, NEEDS AND SUGGESTIONS
Keywords:
corporate governance, corporate governance code, soft law, comply or explain, agency theory, stakeholder theory, compliance costs, joint-stock company, corporate controlAbstract
This article analyzes the issue of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of adopting a corporate governance code as a separate regulatory legal document from a scientific and practical point of view. The study highlights the theoretical foundations of corporate governance, in particular the agency theory and stakeholder theory, and reveals the role of the corporate governance code as an ex-ante control mechanism. It also justifies the use of the corporate governance code mainly as a soft law instrument that is, based on the experience of the USA, Great Britain, Germany and OECD countries, based on the principle of complying or explaining. The article also analyzes the practice of Uzbekistan and concludes that granting the status of a regulatory legal document to the corporate governance code may lead to excessive compliance costs and an increase in the bureaucratic burden. As a result, it is justified that it is appropriate to maintain the corporate governance code not as a mandatory regulatory legal document, but as a flexible and recommendatory regulatory tool.
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