FORMATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT: THE UZBEKISTAN MODEL AND FOREIGN EXPERIENCE
Keywords:
Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, constitutional reforms, government formation, accountability before parliament, appointment of the Prime Minister, Cabinet of Ministers, appointment of ministers, resignation of the GovernmentAbstract
The article provides a comparative-legal analysis of the appointment of the Prime Minister, the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers, the resignation of the Government, and changes in the institutions of the vote of no confidence in connection with the adoption of the new edition of the Constitution of Uzbekistan in 2023, based on the “how it was – how it happened – what changed” formula, as well as in the context of the Constitution and legislative norms regulating these issues. Within the framework of the analysis, the model of New Uzbekistan is compared with the constitutional experience of countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Poland, Russia, Kazakhstan, the conceptual and legal significance of important changes in each institution is revealed, and the author’s conclusions on the characteristics of the form of public administration as a result of constitutional reforms are put forward.
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